Working knowledge - bet 26
Belief in supernaturals has the effect of explaining how causal chains start (cf. Atran 2002), but the real advantage is that it allows the illusion of control. If rain gods control the rain, we can get rain by praying and sacrificing to them. If rain comes from the mindless interaction of warm and cold fronts, or winds blowing from sea to mountain, we can do nothing to relieve drought or stop flood. If disease is sent by God as warning or punishment, we can pray, but if disease is a mindless and unpredictable process caused by incomprehensible forces (as it was—recall—right up to the late 19th century), we have no control over it. Nothing is more terrifying than being hopelessly unable to control something so dangerous and unpredictable.
Epidemics, earthquakes, tornadoes, tidal waves, and similar catastrophes are the common lot of humans, but were totally beyond anyone’s ability to explain until the last century or two. Yet, people desperately needed to understand them, in order to try to predict when they might strike, or at least to feel in control of the situation. Understanding is the most basic form of control. Thus, all such events are explained, throughout the world—almost invariably and inevitably by resort to supernatural entities.
Nothing could be more logical than assuming that glaciers are living beings; they move erratically, act unpredictably, and do things that seem to be actual responses to human conduct. Thus, indigenous beliefs in glacial intelligence persist in northwestern North America, as brilliantly described by Julie Cruikshank in Do Glaciers Listen? (2005). Glaciers, for instance, hate to have meat fried near them. People who do that are likely to fall into a crevasse next time they are on the glacier. Such beliefs have spread to some White settlers. This all may seem “supernatural” to the reader of the present text, but it is based on the very best analysis that knowledgeable local people could do in premodern times. As Cruikshank points out, they probably reasoned by thinking that glaciers are like bears (both being huge, mobile, and dangerous), and bears will come after you (to grab the food) if you fry meat near them.
A nice example of the development of a heuristic is the widespread “doctrine of signatures” in herbal medicine. According to this idea, “like cures like”—plants with red juice build blood, the lung-shaped leaves of lungwort show it cures lung problems, and of course anything shaped like a penis or testicles must be aphrodisiac. On the face of it, this is logical misattribution at its worst. However, Bradley Bennett (2007) has recently shown that in fact the plants often do work for the conditions indicated. The “likeness” then has obviously developed as a mnemonic, rather than being the source of the indication in the first place. This explains why one must sometimes use a good deal of imagination to see the “likeness.” One can go on to infer that these cases were overgeneralized, to produce the plausible but wrong assumption that God had put signs on the plants and animals to show what they cured—this being the actual “doctrine of signatures.” Hence the Chinese idea that port wine builds blood, the European idea that asparagus is a male aphrodisiac, and so forth.
Another important case study is the worldwide explanation of earthquakes. Almost everywhere, people left to themselves conclude that earthquakes are caused by a giant being in or under the earth. The being sometimes becomes agitated and shakes. The Greeks held the god Atlas, who holds the earth, responsible. The Northwest Coast Native peoples believe a giant fish or serpent is responsible. Other groups worldwide blame turtles, crocodiles, and other large sluggish creatures.
Other, more scientific speculators have thought that winds caused earthquakes. The Greek Anaxagoras seems to be the first attested in this regard. Thomas Gage in the 17th century thought that Mexico City’s many earthquakes were caused by violent winds blowing into and through the great caves in the region (Gage 1958). The great Arab thinker Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā) had heard an earlier version of that story. He rejected it, and discussed other traditional explanations, including heavy rains, landslides, and motion of natural forces in the ground (Ahmad and Baipakov 2000:210). He was sharp enough to figure out the real explanation: large blocks of the earth’s crust moving slowly underground. He had, alas, no way to prove it. Science abandoned this idea, and as recently as my student days earthquakes were often explained by shrinking, or, alternatively, by expanding, of the earth. Slippage along fault lines was known by the end of the 19th century, but no one knew what caused it. Understanding the actual reasons for earthquakes had to wait until the mid-20th century, when plate tectonics finally solved the problem.
However, knowing “real” causes for things is not always necessary. People need to know what works, not necessarily why it works.
Many cultures learned long ago that certain herbal teas—from willow, wintergreen, and the like—cure headaches. As the Grete Herball of 1529 says, echoing Greek and Arabic knowledge, “the iuce of the leves of wilowe is good to delay the heate in fevers yf it be dronken” (quoted Isaacs 1990:362-363). The natural inference was that these plants contained an “antifebrile” principle or a divine spirit. We now know the “spirit” is salicylic acid, source of our aspirin. Knowing that we are dealing with a simple anti-inflammatory chemical reaction, instead of a god, helps us design better pills. But the traditional cultures did perfectly well knowing only that willow tea cured headaches.
My long-standing favorite among “wrong” views is humoral medicine. I have published extensively on it elsewhere, and need not go into detail here (Anderson 1987, 1996). It was based on the classical Greek theory that there are four elements: earth, air, fire, and water, and four qualities: hot, cold, wet and dry. Earth is cold and dry, fire hot and dry, water cold and wet, air hot and wet. They can transform into each other. Earth, heated, can turn to fire if it has enough organic material in it. Air, when chilled, precipitates water. Fire burns itself out, turning itself and the material it burned into gas as everything cools down. Water, heated, turns to gas. Nothing could be more reasonable to assume that these are all basic in the world. (There were also Greeks who asserted the primacy of one or two of these; different ones had different advocates.) Alchemy made perfect sense in such a world (Hill 1990a).
Similarly, it made perfect sense to see human illness as unbalance of hot, cold, wet, and dry, and the great Greek physician Galen developed a brilliant and comprehensive theory of this. The theory stood for over 1600 years as state-of-the-art medicine, and survives widely in folk and traditional medicine today (Galen 1997, 2000, 2003, 2006; cf. Anderson 1987, 1996). This theory extended from Europe to China, spread throughout the New World, and influenced most of the globe. It was probably the most widespread belief system in the world 200 years ago—far more widespread than any of the religions.
Humoral medicine was thoroughly scientific and did not resort to supernatural agents of any kind. It was based on the best observation, experiment, and inference possible in pre-laboratory days. It developed internationally. It allowed people to control their fates, and to heal themselves. It was, in short, one of the most stunningly brilliant and valuable creations of the human mind. It was also entirely wrong as to its assumptions about what went on in the black box.
A related theory was that of miasmas: poisonous humors that caused disease. This was standardly used to explain outbreaks of bubonic plague. It is interesting to see the greatest environmental scientist of the 19th century, George Perkins Marsh, speculating on malaria in his magistral work, Man and Nature (2003 : 353): “In fact,…the mixing of salt and fresh water in coast marshes and lagoons is deleterious to the sanitary condition of the vicinity…. It has been suggested that the admission of salt water to the lagoons and rivers kills many fresh water plants and animals, while the fresh water is equally fatal to many marine organisms, and that the decomposition of the remains originates poisonous miasmata. Other theories however have been proposed….”
The real explanation is that the malaria-carrying Anopheles mosquitoes of south Europe (where Marsh was writing) like brackish water. But the literally incredible saga of malarial transmission by mosquitoes was still unknown in 1864. Soon after, the brilliant work of Ronald Ross and Patrick Manson solved the problem. One component was Ross’ realization that some mosquitoes are different; those that have spotted wings and stand on their heads carry malaria, others do not (Desowitz 1991). So insect taxonomy, proverbially the most useless and worthless scientific activity (“butterfly collecting”), saved countless millions of lives—as it was to do again, time after time, in studies of plague, typhus, leishmaniasis, oncocerciasis, Chagas disease, and other insect-borne ailments. Not even Marsh, one of the greatest scientific minds of his century, could have imagined this in 1864. The most plausible theory, especially given its long history, was the one Marsh cautiously extended.
Today, humoral medicine has become “pseudoscience.” Monday-morning quarterbacking is the safest kind.
William Wimsatt (2007) has concocted a whole philosophy of science based on this principle. Instead of seeking perfect truth through deductive logic, he seeks “piecewise approximations to reality” by frankly using heuristics and other rough-and-ready search strategies. He sees science as an asymptotic approach to truth, won through messy processes, rather than a perfect, pure system of the sort advocated in science classes in the 1950s. This view brings modern science in line with early science and also with traditional empirical knowledge.
Roberto Gonzalez’ brilliant study Zapotec Science (Gonzalez 2001) includes the Earth God and several other forces considered by the Zapotec to be perfectly ordinary everyday reality. Most Zapotec science is perfectly empirical and factual (see also Hunn 2008), and Gonzalez shows it grows and increases like international laboratory science. Within Zapotec science, the gods are black-box variables inserted to make causal inference better. Gonzalez shows that they not only do not invalidate the science, they actually allow Zapotec science to be more accurate than “western” science in dealing with strictly local, familiar phenomena. International science may have better causal concepts in its black box, but it lacks the local knowledge that allow the gods to track reality. The gods connect X and Y perfectly well, not because they exist, but because the Zapotec know (better than biologists) how X and Y fit together, and simply infer that the causal connection is a divine agent.
The Zapotec also use, as explanatory variables, the humors of Hippocratic medical fame—hot, cold, wet, and dry. They were imported to Oaxaca from Spain in the 16th century, there to fuse with similar native concepts.
The Chinese have been accused of looking at “correlation,” not causation, but this is too simple. (I draw on my own research here, but see also Harbsmeier 1998; Lloyd 2007:124-130.) Chinese reasoning by analogy, correspondence, and correlation depends on assumptions of functional relationships. They knew that the liver, stomach, heart, and other organs must keep working together. None causes the others, but all depend on each other’s proper functioning. They compared this to the macrocosm: trees depend on water, flowing water depends on rain, and so on, but these things constantly interact in functional association, rather than one doing its thing and then the next in line doing its. Arguments in early Chinese philosophy make it clear that the analogies so often used in argument were not intended to be mere metaphors. An analogy was intended to capture some real, natural, functional relationship. Theories of causation were thus real enough, but they ran heavily to mutual or cyclic causation, not X-then-Y stories of the sort the Greeks preferred.
In other words, both the Greeks and the Chinese attended to real causal chains in the real world. The Greeks attended to X-then-Y chains, the Chinese to scenarios in which X-and-Y-mutually-interact.
As in many other cases, this gives us a very interesting insight into how people reason when there is simply no way to find a perfectly correct answer. Marx, Foucault, and many other thinkers would assume that powerful people would fill the gap by some self-serving explanation, and force the masses to accept it (see below). This does not happen. There is no benefit to the powerful in thinking a dragon shakes the earth. There is no benefit to the powerful in believing in flows of qi. There is no benefit from coming up with the correct explanation, either; plate tectonics has not made anyone a dictator.
Similar explanations cluster around epidemics. Again, educated Chinese usually explained them as due to problems with the flows of qi. This seems minimally helpful to rulers.
However, in this case, other cultures do resort to explanations that benefit the powers-that-be. Worldwide, epidemics are often explained as punishment for sin or for broken taboos or other social rules. Today, for instance, we blame them on various kinds of pollution and unsanitary practice. The value of this type of explanation for shoring up rules, and therefore the positions of the leaders of society, has long been noted by social critics. Religious leaders are especially prone to claim their followers have sinned, and must contribute heavily to the church for relief. People in all societies can spot the shaman’s or priest’s self-interest in such explanations. Yet people are still easily fooled. Both epidemics and individual illness cases are often explained as due to witchcraft, or to “carriers,” which gives the leaders an excuse to eliminate their competitors or any unpopular individuals.
The recurrent epidemics of bubonic plague that swept Europe from 1346 onward were first explained this way, and this remained the most popular explanation. Europeans, however, learned to cope. At first they killed the “witches,” Jews, and “heretics”—always the first suspects in such cases. When that failed, they tried prayer and self-flagellation. When that failed, they tried various purifying means, including sweet-scented items to drive away noxious vapors. (The pomander was invented for this.) Finally, quarantine and cleanup were discovered—quite early, as it turned out. Slowly the plague was controlled by such public-health measures (Anderson ms 2; Cipolla 1981). The AIDS epidemic went through the same stages, though much more rapidly. Even now, many people believe AIDS is God’s punishment for homosexuality, or the result of a conspiracy, or otherwise unrelated to viral cause (Kalichman 2009).
In general, we “moderns” claim to be too sophisticated to believe in evil witchcraft, but many liberal beliefs about conservatives and right-wing beliefs about liberals are cut from the same cloth A Martian anthropologist would surely class them with the sorcery beliefs studied by Evans-Pritchard. Conspiracy theories abound. Lunatic-fringe theories like blaming mercury in inoculations for autism (Offit 2008) propagate like wildfire on the Internet.
In short, inference about causation—like much other inference—is difficult (Hume would say impossible) in the real world. This is not only because it is intrinsically difficult, but because the common-sense explanations are wrong. It is common sense to look for simple, straightforward explanations, like the Greek “four element” theory. It is common sense for humans to infer agency unless it is certainly absent, and thus to assume that every event is caused by a conscious, deliberate act of some sentient being. It is common sense to recognize that insects are always around and biting us, and we aren’t always sick, so how can insects carry disease? It is common sense to think that CO2 is only a small fraction of the air; how can it cause global warming? Lloyd (2007:129) points out that children develop theories of cause in similar ways—they make the simplest inference given human heuristics and biases, not the one that fits observation.
In ordinary working philosophy of science, systems are commensurable in so far as they can be described and understood in each other’s terms (Kuhn 1962). Thomas Kuhn pointed out that two theories may be so different that they cannot be tested in each other’s terms, because the measures are so different. They are noncomparable. An obvious example is provided by creationism vs. evolution; creationists reject the entire scientific enterprise on which evolution theories are based, and evolutionists generally rule divine arbitrariness completely out of their universe of explanation. Much less obviously different theories can still be incommensurable. Consider, for instance, a theory of economic development that relates to total overall wealth creation, versus one that relates to and is evaluated by its contribution to raising the incomes of the poor and reducing social inequality. The outcome measures of these theories are basically different, so the theories cannot be directly compared.
Radical incommensurability would be found if cultures were so different that no cross-cultural understanding were possible.
I have demolished, above, the idea that cultures are utterly closed phenomenological worlds. If that view were were true, the attempt to understand other people would be a kind of violation of the “other” culture and of its bearers. Knowledge can be exploitatively appropriated—stolen—but it cannot be shared, because cross-cultural communication does not involve true sharing (cf. Plotkin 1993 vs. Shiva 1997). In this view, modern agriculture—based on bread wheat that originally came from the Caspian Sea area, rice from China, potatoes from Peru and Chile, chickpeas from Anatolia, cotton from South America, and so on—is nothing but a vast biopiracy project.
Yet, social life and communication struggle on, somehow, and are not greatly hampered by cultural lines. Not only do we share enough to talk. We interact enough, talk enough, to bring us ever closer. We can learn.
Ronald Nigh (2002) has described Maya medicine as incommensurable with “western” medicine (he meant contemporary international biomedicine). He postulates that studying Maya botany from the point of view of biomedicine (to find new medicines) invokes a reductionist “gaze” that amounts to “herbal fetishism.”
To be sure, Maya beliefs about the universe are not always the same as what one finds in a college botany textbook. Maize is a god (now equated with Jesus), animals have spirits and divine guardians, and rain is not only god-sent but the rainclouds are actual incarnations of the chaak gods. One must apologize to the forest for cutting fields in it, and then thank the spirits of forest and milpa for the harvest.
Carlos Lenkersdorf’s wonderfully evocative description of the highland Maya view (Lenkersdorf 1996) contrasts their “cosmovision” with the “western” (in his book, the educated Hispanic-Mexican) one. Certainly, the Maya have a cosmic vision of the world—a beautiful, powerful, poetic one, filled with spirit and emotion. As described by Nigh, Lenkersdorf, and other authors (e.g. Gossen 1974; Tedlock 1985; Vogt 1969), the highland Maya see a world not only of maize and beans but also of gods, animal spirits, magical creatures, wizardry, and ritual song. The lowland Maya are slightly different but broadly similar (Anderson 2003, 2005b).However, this does not mean their medicine is incommensurable with biomedicine. Maya medicine (and probably any other traditional system of this sort) can be described (with some, but not too much, violence to its inherent organization) by analyzing it into three parts: Technology. The actual drugs used and behavior carried out—what is actually done. This involves operations that can be verified by seeing if they work. My experience confirms that of the Maya: many drugs do work. Maya healers have successfully cured me, through herbal treatments and massages, of stomachache, canker sores, itch, skin irritations, headaches, rash, and other minor field ailments. Some of these conditions did not yield to biomedical remedies. In this case, the cures worked just as well for a Euro-American with biological and biomedical training as for the Maya. Anita Ankli has shown that many of these Maya cures work because of powerful antibiotic, antifungal, and anti-irritant chemicals that work perfectly well in a biomedical laboratory (Ankli et al. 1999a, 1999b). However, Maya medicine also uses religious charms and spells; these do not work for me but do work for the Maya (or so they tell me). So pragmatic medicines based on real chemicals work by anybody’s standards, but magic appears to involve genuine incommensurability. Organization. How this enterprise is managed. The sociology of the curing enterprise is addressed here. This, again, seems totally commensurable with modern international science. Maya healers (jmeen in Yucatec Maya; Anderson 2003) and midwives (B. Anderson et al. 2006) are perfectly comparable in their social roles to biomedical doctors and midwives. One can easily describe the social organization of Maya medicine. Each large community has a specialized healer (usually one and no more than one), a genuine expert knowing hundreds of herbs and many ceremonies. Each household has one or two or three people who are moderately knowledgeable—knowing perhaps fifty or a hundred herbs. Each community has one or a few midwives. There are also individuals who know massage, bonesetting, and other field first aid in most communities. They do not always do the same things as biomedical caregivers, but their organizational world is comprehensible. Ideology. Here, commensurability is harder to find, but not insuperably difficult. I follow Weber (e.g. 2001), in using the term to mean ideas and plans in general (not the public display-values of the elite) and in seeing ideology and behavior as mutually influencing each other. Ideology is not purely a result of economics. Maya medical ideology (explanatory models, cosmovision, religion) involves considerations of mystical winds, “heating” and “cooling” forces not related to anything physical or thermal, demonic animal-like beings, and other forces that are imponderable from a biomedical standpoint. It is indeed difficult to see how biomedicine could accommodate evil winds or the demon opossum (bok’ol ooch) within its framework, or evaluate the effectiveness of a soul-cleansing ceremony. Conversely, the Maya have no way to measure or test, within their system, a study of the genome of a virus. These matters are, indeed, truly incommensurable between these systems.
Even so, with competent ethnography, the outsider can come to understand the Maya system. Significantly, there are Maya who combine both systems, such as Dr. Gilberto Balam, who is both an MD and an expert on Maya healing (Balam 1992).
Do'stlaringiz bilan baham:
©2018 Учебные документы
Рады что Вы стали частью нашего образовательного сообщества.